The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European Paradox
William Wallace (1999)

Legitimate unit within NATO, EU and OSCE remains states, but interaction of thousands f representatives monolithic external sovereignty of the 19th century.
+ States not only significant actors in these institutions : NATO Sec-Gen, Council of Europe’s Commission and Court of Human rights hear cases from individual citizens
Paradoxically, gvts of former socialist states in central and eastern Europe have celebrated their regained sovereignty by declaring their determination to join all these sovereignty-constraining institutions
Distinction btw states which have an international capacity vs. does who do not remains clearly drawn.
Westphalian principle of sovereign equality = weighted voting, but national territory remains clearly defined.
Constitutional independence but not withdrawal bcz costs in terms of loss of status, influence and economic advantages would be very high.
New interpretation of statehood remains unclear
Sovereignty hasn’t been transferred to state-like federation but sovereignty increasingly held in common = pooled among gvts.
Inherently untidy and inefficient system, built on sustaining the illusion that gvts can themselves provide their voters with benefits which in practice can only be won though common action with others.
= postmodern : shared discourse which the participants prefer to understand from different perspectives and which they interpret in different ways for different audiences.

Transformation of Western Europe:
WE state system rebuilt after WW2 on the basis of compromised sovereignty : Marshall Plan + Atlantic Alliance
Revisionist historians have traced ambiguity of commitment to integration within even the most “enthusiastic” gvts, seeking to use econ benefits provided by integration to support national reconstruction.
Pb of Germany was central to construction of compromised-sovereignty order
De Gaulle appeared to reassert