{draw:g} Should we worry about the increasing European reliance on energy from Russia? The energy consumption of the European Union is going to grow over the coming decades. Today about two thirds of natural gas consumed in the EU are already imported and European demand for gas could increase by 50% by 2020 (M. Raymond, 2007; D. Finon, C. Locatelli ; 2008). There has been renewed interest in the issue of European gas import dependence following the gas struggle between Russia and Ukraine during the last week of 2005 and the beginning of 2006 (A. Spanjer ; 2006). Indeed since 2005, Gazprom produces about 93% of Russian natural gas, while controlling 16% of world reserves and is the principal natural gas supplier to 18 countries of the European Union. It also supplies 35 percent of Ukraine’s requirements and 100 percent of Georgia’s (MB. Schaffer; 2008). However, between anxiety and serenity expert opinions are divided. The Russia's near monopoly of Eurasian distribution system natural gas threat the independent foreign policy of the European Union (MB. Schaffer; 2008). L.Mauring and D. Schear(2006) suggested that threats to intervention military may be not a problem in the EU-Russia relationship further, developing a growing interest in Russia Common Market of the EU poses new threats from other origins. Although the risk of an economic conflict are obviously more likely than the risk of military intervention, the show of force on the State of Georgia in August 2008 reminds us that the homeland of the Tsars is again a military power and that his expansionist wishes and some dictatorial methods of the old regime remain. As if to confirm these economic risks the same year, Douglas B. Reynolds and M. Kolodziej (2006) declared that the potential re-nationalization of the oil industry of Russia, with a passage from the Russian State from 38% to over 50% in its share is not only intended to limit the need of foreign investors, but also reflects a desire by the