Equilibrium

variable of interest, suppose that global, three-dimensional, accurate estimates of the paleoceanographic temperature, salinity, oxygen and nutrient fields were magically available from cores at some time, T, when the ocean was thought to be in quasi-equilibrium. (A data set like this, of course, exceeds that available for the contemporary ocean, but with the WOCE hydrography [see e.g., Siedler et al., 2001; http://www.woce.org/atlas_webpage/] we are about as close to it as we are likely to be anytime soon

and Quantitative Analysis, 7, 1851-1872. [20] MOSSIN, J., 1966, Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market, Econometrica, 34, 768-783. [21] MUSIELA, M. & RUTKOWSKI, M., 1997, Martingale Methods in Financial Modelling, Applications of Mathematics, Springer. [22] PERETTI-WATEL, P., 2000, Sociologie du Risque, HER/Armand Colin, Paris. 45 46 BIBLIOGRAPHIE [23] SHARPE, W., 1964, Capital Asset Prices : a Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, Journal of Finance, 19, 425-442. [24]

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textbook observation is that under conditions without capital controls, monetary policy would be ineffective in small open economies with fixed exchange rate systems (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998: 610). This is because any displacement of monetary equilibrium would result in capital flows rather than changes in expenditure that might alter prices or output. In the absence of capital controls under a fixed exchange rate system, for example, if a central bank injects funds into the market by open market

influential writings of Von Weiszäcker (1980), Demsetz (1982) and Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982). Their normative approach give the antitrust authority the opportunity to lead a policy guided by the promotion of efficiency. Perfect competition and equilibrium remain however the reference. Some economists, stemming essentially from the austrian tradition, are promoting the classical vision of competition, a dynamic and behavioural approach, unlike the structural and static view of the standard model.

inherent in the human situation and about improvising or experiencing ... such =ossibilities as are also inherent in the obstacles, the disjunctures, and the =eopardy. It is also a statement about perseverance ... resilience ... the =aintenance of equilibrium despite precarious circumstances and about achieving elegance in th[at] very process.... It is thus the musical equivalent =f the epic.... (Stomping the Blues 250-51) Jazz, born of the blues, is the =rban version of those statements. Furthermore

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a “short-side rule” equation. This equation allows for the possibility that, in the presence of rigidities, the interest rate does not fulfill its market-clearing function, so that the actual amount of credit observed is not the (unobservable) equilibrium amount, but rather the minimum of credit demanded and credit supplied. In its simplest form, our model can be written as: Ctd = X 1't β1 + u1t ' Cts = X 2t β 2 + u2t (1) (2) (3) Ct = min(Ctd , Cts ) Where C td and C ts are the unobservable

Bruxelles. GHIRARDELLO A. (2003), « La discrimination sur le marché du travail : du problème de coordination à l’égalité dans l’emploi », Thèse pour le doctorat, Université Paris X-Nanterre. HARSANYI J.C. et SELTEN R. (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MIT Press. HIRSCHMAN A. (1970), Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Harvard University Press. Cambridge. HUGOUNENQ R. et VENTELOU B. (2002), « Les ‘services publics français’ à l’heure de leur intégration européenne », Revue

Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income: An Analytical Approach (Woytinsky lecture), Institute of Public Administration. Becker, G. (1981), A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press, Boston. Becker G.S. et Tomes N. (1979), “An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87, No. 6, p. 1153-1189. Becker G.S. et Tomes N. (1986), “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families”, Journal of Labor Economics