SECRET//NOFORN//20310306

NGIC Assessment

(U) Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah I, April 2004
(U) Purpose (U) This is the second of a series of assessments that analyzes recent warfare in complex environments. Enemy employment of asymmetric tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) during the Battle of Fallujah in April 2004 offers many useful lessons learned in how a relatively weak adversary can prevent the United States from accomplishing its military objectives.

(U) Key Points • (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The insurgent defense of Fallujah was a dispersed, nonlinear defense in depth that involved networks of small combat cells. Mobile cells, often only the size of a fire team, conducted a fluid defense using hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and standoff attacks. • (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Insurgent TTP were designed to allow Marine units to penetrate in depth into their territory so they could set up ambush and swarming opportunities on isolated targets. The insurgents constantly sought to isolate Marine units in order to destroy them piecemeal. • (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) There was no central leadership in charge of all insurgents. We assess that the insurgent leadership model was similar to the Shura council model employed in November 2004. • (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) Insurgents deliberately fought from sensitive areas such as mosques, schools, and residential areas. Mosques served as command centers, fighting positions, weapon caches, rallying points, and hospitals. Minarets were used by snipers, observers, and forward observers. • (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The basic insurgent supply concept was to pre-position and prestock food, water, and ammunition in caches throughout the city and depend on limited resupply once fighting began. Most caches in the city were inside buildings; those outside the city in the surrounding rural areas were often in palm groves. • (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) The outcome of a purely military contest in Fallujah was always a foregone