In the case of Coker V. Georgia, the plurality of justices ruled the death sentence for a rape of an adult woman was grossly disproportionate and an extreme penalty for the crime. Therefore, it was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.

Though rape is an atrocious crime, it does not in any case compare to murder, for “murder necessarily results in the physical death of the victim while rape does not” (pg, 512). The distinction is relevant in determining if retribution is handled properly in this case. If Coker had killed Mrs. Carver, she would not have had the opportunity to see what the future held for her. Her life would have ended then and there, and only her legacy would have been left behind. Though rape is a damaging experience, because she was raped and not killed she had the opportunity to live and see what the future held for her. This analysis is applicable in order to understand why Coker should not been sentenced to death. Perhaps castration would be more appropriate than death in this case, because Coker would lose sexual impulse. Through castration, he would be given the same opportunity as Mrs. Carver to see what the future held for him. And just like her, he would be deprived of an important dignity, but would still be able to live and attempt to better his existence. It is arguable that castration is cruel punishment, but rape is also a cruel crime; the most important fact is that neither party loses their life. Both would live with serious injury, but most importantly, they would still remain among the living. This is the best retribution possible under the Eighth Amendment.

Additionally, were Coker sentenced to death for this specific case, it would be clear that his condemnation was based on his previous crime and not on the issue at stake: we would have a system advocating revenge over justice. Coker should have received the death sentence when he raped and committed murder. Under those